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The appointment of Supreme Court justices is a politically-charged
process and the "ideology" (or "judicial philosophy") of the nominees is
perceived as playing a potentially relevant role in their future decisionmaking. It is fairly easy to intuit that ideology somehow enters the
analysis with respect to politically divisive issues such as abortion and
procreative rights, sexual conduct, freedom of speech, separation of
church and state, gun control, procedural protections for the accused in
criminal cases, and governmental powers. Many studies have tackled the
question of the relevance of the ideology of the Justices or appellate
judges on these issues, often finding a correlation between policy
preferences and decisions. This Article fills a gap in the existing literature
examining the correlation between ideology and judicial decision-making
in the highly technical area of securities regulation. We address the
question if "conservative Justices" are more "pro Wall Street," and
"liberal Justices" more "pro investors." Our results confirm that, even
using different definitions and measures of ideology, conservative
Justices favor "free and less regulated markets," and liberal Justices are
more protective of investors, especially small investors, more concerned
about market failures, and more in favor of private plaintiffs or
government intervention. Two caveats are important. First, we do not
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associate any negative implication with the fact that ideology plays a role
in deciding "hard cases." Obviously our study does not in any way imply
that the Justices distort the law in order to achieve predetermined policy
goals, but simply that, when the law is ambiguous, different and
legitimate interpretative approaches and policy considerations might lead
to different outcomes. The best guarantee of good decision-making is not
an abstract aspiration to a completely apolitical adjudicator, but in a
diverse composition of our courts. Second, while the data indicate a
meaningful correlation, the correlation does not entirely explain the
positions of the Justices, therefore confirming the independence and
prestige of the Supreme Court and its members.
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INTRODUCTION

President Ronald Reagan nominated Judge Robert Bork for Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court in 1987.1 Before his confirmation hearing
at the Senate, Senator Ted Kennedy took the floor and delivered a
statement that was a death knell to Judge Bork's appointment:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be
forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at
segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down
citizens' doors in midnight raids, and schoolchildren could
not be taught about evolution, writers and artists could be
censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the
federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of
Americans. 2
The Senate did not confirm Judge Bork's nomination.3
A few decades earlier, in what was one of the first modem
confirmation hearings, the Senate was discussing the nomination of thenProfessor Felix Frankfurter by President Franklin Roosevelt. 4 The year
was 1939. 5 The proposed appointment of a liberal judge of Jewish
descent, who was born in Austria and co-founded the ACLU, was both a
symbolic attack on the Nazi gangrene spreading in Europe and a spark
for a controversy ready to flame in America. 6 Several people testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee opposing Frankfurter. 7 Allen Zoll,
the executive vice president of the American Federation Against
Communism, went on the record saying:
There are two reasons why I oppose the appointment of Prof
Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court of the United States.
One is because I believe his record proves him unfit for the
position, irrespective of his race, and the other is because of
his race .... [T]he Jew has been fostering movements that
1. See John M. Broder, Social Causes Defined Kennedy, Even at the End of a 46- Year
Careerin the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/us/politi
cs/27kennedy.html.
2. Id.
3. For an account of Bork's failed appointment, see L. A. Powe Jr., From Bork to Souter,
27 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 781, 783-84 (1991); see also THE BORK HEARINGS: HIGHLIGHTS FROM
THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION BATTLE IN U.S. HISTORY 163 (Ralph E.

Shaffer ed., 2005).
4. Lori A. Ringhand, Aliens on the Bench: Lessons in Identity, Race andPoliticsfrom the
First "Modern" Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing to Today, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 795,

797.
5. Id. at 797.
6. Id. at 798-99, 819.
7. Id. at 801.

FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol, 67

are subversive to our Government. 8
Notwithstanding the anti-Semitic rants of Mr. Zoll and other
witnesses, the Senate confirmed9 Frankfurter, who went on to serve for
twenty-three years on the Court.
These two anecdotes corroborate, if necessary, that the appointment
of Supreme Court Justices is a politically charged process and that the
"ideology" of the nominees appears to play a potentially relevant role in
their future decision-making. To clarify, this Article's use of the term
ideology does not in any way imply any negative connotation. A
synonym could be "judicial philosophy," referring to a vision of the
world, a system of beliefs, and a policy perspective that combine to affect
the way Justices interpret the law. It is not meant to imply a bias or an
intentional distortion of the law to achieve a predetermined result. It
simply means that when there is room for interpretation and reasonable
minds can disagree, Justices and judges can reach different conclusions
based on their values, understandings, and beliefs. In the last few decades,
Justices appears to have
the process of nominating and confirming
10
become increasingly more partisan.
Numerous jurists in the United States, especially up through the
1940s, argued that legal interpretation can and should be separated from,
and not influenced by, politics or other ideological beliefs. According to
this "legalist" perspective, stare decisis and the original interpretation of
statutes constrain judges and prevent creative judicial decision-making. 1 1
Although somewhat out of fashion after the legal realism movement,
8. Id. at 797 (alteration in original).
9. Joseph Gumina, FromAustria to Sacco and Vanzetti: The Development ofFrankfurter's
"FundamentalRights"Theory, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 389, 395-96, 400 (2008). Despite Justice
Frankfurter's liberal tendencies, his belief in judicial restraint often put him at odds with other
Justices such as Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Chief Justice Earl Warren. See JOSEPH P.
LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 80-81, 83 (1975); Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict
Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and the Clash of Personalitiesand
Philosophieson the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71, 81-83, 111, 105. For an

insightful view of Justice Frankfurter's positions, see generally LASH, supra.
10. See Joseph E. Frank, Politics and Judicial Nomination: The Supreme Court from
Reagan Through Bush, 34 VT. B.J. 53, 53 (2008) (reviewing JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG,
SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT (2007)).

11. See Stephen M. Feldman, Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie? The Politics of
Adjudication, 18 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 19 (2008) (arguing that Supreme Court judicial
decisions are "politics writ small"). For a description of this approach, see also Stephen M.
Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics?Harmonizingthe Internaland External Views
of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 89, 96-98 (2005) (asserting that
legal scholars and judges believe the law influences the Court more than politics); Barry
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 258, 276 & n.95 (2005)
(comparing positive and normative views of judicial decision-making).
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these arguments still appear, particularly in the appointments process. For
example, at his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts
proclaimed: "[J]udges are like umpires-umpires don't make the rules;
they apply them."12 This is an idea as old as the concept of separation of
powers. In the early eighteenth century, Montesquieu famously remarked
that "[m]ais les juges de la nation ne sont, comme nous avons dit, que la
bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi," invoking a slightly different
metaphor than Justice Roberts's but making the same point:
3 the proper
role of the judiciary is simply to "declare" what the law is.'
If legal interpretation was such a mechanistic activity, society would
not need judges and lawyers at all; society could simply feed into a
computer the existing laws and regulations along with the facts of a case,
and it would spit back the "mathematically" infallible outcome.1 4 Even
without subscribing to the battle cry of "critical legal studies" that "Law
is Politics! ' 15 or without surrendering completely to the notion of legal
indeterminacy, it is difficult to seriously argue that the cultural, social,
racial, economic, religious, and political backgrounds and beliefs of
judges (in one word, their ideologies) do not play some role in how they
12. Robert Schwartz, Like They See 'Em, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/opinion/06schwartz.html.
13. MONTESQUIEU, DE L'EsPRIT DES Lois 305 (1834). The English translation of this phrase
is, "But the nation's judges are, as we said, the mouth that pronounces the words of the law."
14. In a brilliant and entertaining book, Professor Jay Wexler illustrates how even the
apparently more unequivocal legal rules are subject to a certain degree of indeterminacy. Take,
for instance, Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, providing that to be eligible for
President of the United States you need to be at least thirty-five years of age. U.S. CONST. art. If,
§ 1, cl. 4. Several scholars, in an effort to demonstrate that there is always room for legal
interpretation, have attempted to argue that the provision does not really mean "thirty-five." See
JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES: UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH TEN OF ITS MOST

CURIOUS PROVISIONS 81 (2011). Proponents of legal realism started arguing in the 1920s that
judges were subject to political and personal preferences that the binding value of precedents
could not curtail. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148, 151 (reprinted 1936)
(1930) (echoing a famous position expressed in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW

5 (1881)). A fundamental contribution in this field came in 1948 from C. Herman Pritchett, who
noted the increasing use of dissenting opinions by Supreme Court Justices since the end of the
1930s. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 25 (1948). One could argue that the

mechanical view of decision-making could not be so obvious if different Justices could interpret
the same provisions in sometimes radical and opposite ways. The debate juxtaposing textual
interpretation as a mechanic activity to the desirability that judges also take into account other
elements in disposing cases dates back to the German jurist Rudolph Ritter von Jhering (18181892) and his critique of the Pandectists. See MARIO G. LOSANO, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 839 (David S. Clark ed., 2007), available at

http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412952637.n380.
15. For an overview of critical legal studies, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987). For a classical work on how politics affect judging, see DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
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interpret and apply the law. 16 Independently of how conscious and
deliberate the influence of a judge's personal "ideology" is on that
judge's decision-making, such an influence likely exists, at least to some
degree.17 Americans tend to agree because in a recent poll, only one in
16. See infra note 27; Section III.A. For an example of a work considering the role of
religious beliefs on the selection of Justices, see Christine L. Nemacheck, Have Faith in Your
Nominee? The Role of CandidateReligious Beliefs in Supreme Court Selection Politics,56 DRAKE
L. REV. 705, 705-06, 725 (2008) (arguing that "religion does not systematically affect a
President's selection of a candidate from the short list of potential nominees"); see also Donald
R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The Decision Making of Christian
Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507, 507 (1999) (suggesting that evangelical
Justices are more conservative than their religious counterparts). Other works take a
complementary but distinctive perspective, arguing that policy preferences do not simply motivate
judges in casting their votes, but that-in the light of those preferences-they vote strategically,
taking into account the opinion and possible alliances on the panel deciding the case, the risk of
being reversed, the chances that the legislature, the executive power or other governmental
officers might act to nullify a judicial decision, the possibility of being reelected or promoted to a
higher court, etc. For a discussion of strategic voting, which is not central to this Article, see LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998), and Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael

Gely, Strategic JudicialDecision-Making,in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 34,
35 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008). Walter F.
Murphy made the pioneering work in this area. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY (1964).
17. Feldman, supra note 11, at 28. Erwin Chemerinsky observes: "[W]e all share the
perception that the Court is 'objective' and decides questions based on the law, separate from the
ideologies of the justices. There is thus a sense that it is the 'law,' not the justices, that is
responsible for the Court's decisions. This is nonsense and has always been. The Court is made
up of men, and now finally women, who inevitably base their decisions on their own values,
views, and prejudices." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 10

(2014). Of course, at least for the Authors of this Article, this does not necessarily mean that
Justices or judges improperly bend legal interpretation and precedents to achieve desired policy
results. There is ample evidence of Justices going against positions that they have previously
expressed, or the explicit will of the president who appointed them, out of respect for binding
precedent. Two good anecdotal examples concern Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966) and
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The former was the famous case in which the
Warren Court mandated police to provide suspects with warnings concerning the right to counsel
during interrogation and the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498-99.
As a reaction to the Miranda ruling, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, providing for the
admissibility ofvoluntary statements made during an interrogation and when the Miranda warning
is not given to suspects already in custody. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012); JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE

CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 105 (2011). In 1980, the holding of the original 1966 Miranda
decision was reaffirmed in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980): Justice Potter Stewart
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Byron White, two dissenters in Miranda, and also
by four appointees of President Nixon who opposed Miranda in his campaign. Id. at 302;
STEVENS, supra, at 105. In Dickerson, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who has often criticized
Miranda, wrote the Court's opinion confirming the decision, and also holding that § 3501 was
unconstitutional (although he might have simply realized that there were not enough votes to
overturn Miranda, and voted strategically). 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000); STEVENS, supra, at 106.
Another landmark decision, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), shows the independence
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eight respondents said that Justices decide cases solely on legal
grounds. 18

Two prominent scholars that share this conviction are Judge Richard
Posner 19 and Professor Ronald Dworkin.2 ° Although disagreeing on
almost everything else, particularly on the implications of this tenet,2 '
both of these influential writers opine that judges' ideological and
political views influence them, especially Supreme Court Justices in
"hard cases," and that they should also decide cases on the basis of these
views. Professor Lee Epstein is another author who has dedicated an
impressive body of research to investigate (and largely demonstrate) the
role of ideology in judicial decision-making.22 Most social scientists now
easily concede that Justices and judges are policy seekers.23 This is true
in legal systems that select judges through purely nonpolitical, technical
exams that test candidates' legal competency, 24 and even truer and more
apparent in systems like that of the United States in which the election or
of the Justices from the President: Warren Burger, named Chief Justice by President Nixon, wrote
the opinion holding that President Nixon had to produce the tape recordings that led to his
resignation. Id. at 714; STEVENS, supra, at 113-14. Investigating-and even finding-a statistical
correlation between the Justices' ideologies and their ruling does not in any way imply, at least in
our perspective, that the Justices do not respect the law and stare decisis, but more simply that
when there are objective ambiguities in the rules that need to be applied, and there is room for
interpretation, Justices, as all human beings, are (also) influenced by their view of the world.
Similarly, using the political affiliation of the appointing president as a proxy for the Justices'
policy preferences in no way implies a subservient attitude toward the president or his party, but
is simply a way to easily code the likely position of the Justice on the political spectrum, at least
at the time of the nomination.
18. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Ratingfor Justices Hits Just 44% in New
Poll, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-ofamericans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html.
19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 331-32 (2003); Richard

A. Posner, Foreword:A PoliticalCourt, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39 (2005).
20. See RONALD DwoRKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 19 (2006).

21. For a discussion of the positions of Posner and Dworkin, see Feldman, supra note 11,
at 18.
22. Among the vast scholarship of Epstein, in addition to the contributions cited throughout
this Article, it is sufficient here to refer to two works: EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 10,
and LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES 2-3 (2013).
23. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 23.

24. This is the case in France, Italy, and Germany. For some comparative perspectives on
the recruitment ofjudges, see John Bell, Principlesand Methods ofJudicialSelection in France,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757, 1760-61 (1988); Daniel J. Meador, German Appellate Judges: Career
Patternsand American-English Comparisons,67 JUDICATURE 16, 20 (1983); T. Leigh Anenson,
Note, For Whom the Bell Tolls ... JudicialSelection by Election in Latin America, 4 Sw. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 261, 281-82 (1997). For a comparison of selection systems for the Supreme Court or
constitutional courts of different jurisdictions, see Lee Epstein, Jack C. Knight Jr. & Olga
Shvetsova, ComparingJudicialSelection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 11 (2001).

1218
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is an explicitly political process controlled
appointment of the judiciary
25
by voters or politicians.
It is fairly easy to intuit that ideology somehow enters the analysis
with respect to politically divisive issues such as abortion and procreative
rights, sexual conduct, freedom of speech, separation of church and state,
gun control, procedural protections for the accused in criminal cases, and
governmental powers. Supreme Court Justices must often decide cases in
light of an inevitably vague and old Constitution, framed in the very
different sociopolitical context of the eighteenth century, which leaves
latitude to different interpretations. Many studies have tackled the
question of the relevance of the ideology of the Justices or appellate
judges in these situations,26 often finding a correlation between policy
preferences and decisions.
This Article fills a gap in the existing literature on the correlation
between ideology and judicial decision-making in the highly technical
area of securities regulation. 27 Since the enactment of the securities laws
25. See infra Section I.A.
26. See infra Section II.B. The existing empirical literature on the functioning of the courts,
and of the Supreme Court in particular, is very vast. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present,and
Futureof EmpiricalLegalScholarship:JudicialDecision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002
U. ILL. L. REv. 819, 820. An excellent bibliography of the most important contributions is
indicated in EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 89-99. Other reviews of the literature
are offered by Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 TEx. L. REV. 183, 184, 232-33 (2008)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008)) and Gregory C. Sisk, The
Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision
Making, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 873, 899-900 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION
MAKING INTHE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)). There are fewer cases on judicial behavior in
foreign courts, but some are worth mentioning. See ASSAF MEYDANI, THE ISRAELI SUPREME
COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: COURTS AS AGENDA SETITERS (2011) (discussing

the Israeli Supreme Court's judicial behavior); Gila Stopler, The IsraeliSupreme Court-Between
Law and Politics,48 TULSA L. REv. 257 (2012) (reviewing MEYDANI, supra); Shigenori Matsui,
Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 (2011)
(discussing why the Japanese Supreme Court has developed such a "conservative constitutional
jurisprudence"); Tokujin Matsudaira, Judicializationof Politics andthe JapaneseSupreme Court,
88 WASH. U. L. REv. 1559 (2011) (providing an overview of "judicial conservativism in Japan").
A fascinating study on the German Constitutional Court indicates that the justices take into
account the position of the Parliament and of the public opinion in their decisions. See GEORG
VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REvIEw IN GERMANY 121 (2005).

27. Some studies have investigated the correlation between Justices' ideology and
economic issues in general, see EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 106-16, but no
study specifically focuses on the regulation of financial markets. A recent work on the attitude of
the Roberts Court toward securities litigation issues is A. C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the
Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105 (2011). Pritchard argues that even if
the Roberts Court has heard more securities cases than in the past, the Court is quite indifferent
to the substance of the securities laws and their policies. Id at 135. He also contends that the
Roberts Court has not shown a "pro-business" attitude favoring corporate defendants, but rather
a preference for the conservation of the status quo. Id.at 128. This work, however, does not apply

20151
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in the 1930s, the Supreme Court has decided a significant number of
cases in this field. Even if the regulation of financial markets might seem
less politically-charged than some of the issues mentioned above, this
Article argues that there is meaningful room for political ideology and
policy preferences in deciding these cases for a couple of reasons.
First, and obviously with some simplification, this Article assumes
that conservative-leaning people have a stronger belief in the efficiency
of markets and their capacity to police themselves, as well as the
desirability of deregulation. They are also less inclined to conclude that
differences in bargaining power and information asymmetries between
investors, on one hand, and issuers and financial institutions, on the other
hand, require stronger protections for the former. This Article also
assumes that more liberal Justices may put a stronger emphasis on market
failures and the need to protect investors perceived as unable to fend for
themselves, and they support more extensive government intervention in
regulating the securities industry and enforcing the law. This simplified
classification might need some qualification. For example, conservatives
might be less sympathetic to procedural protections for people accused
of criminal violations of the securities laws, such as insider trading.
Overall, however, this Article proposes that this classification is a fair and
reasonable hypothesis to test.
Second, most securities regulation cases that come before the
Supreme Court deal with the interpretation of the federal securities laws:
statutes enacted approximately eighty years ago (even if often updated)
that apply to one of the more rapidly evolving and innovative industries.
Often the statutes are vague or ambiguous, leaving room for different
interpretations. In fact, the Supreme Court often grants certiorari to
resolve a split among circuit courts. In addition, several of the most
important liability provisions designed to protect investors are implied
private causes of actions (section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 for example), which are judge-created provisions that also present
a certain degree of indeterminacy. In a limited number of cases, the
Supreme Court has examined the constitutionality of a statute, in
particular state antitakeover statutes. Even with respect to these problems,
the Justices have few constraints on their interpretation activity. For these
reasons, securities regulation cases represent an interesting opportunity
empirical analysis instruments. The present Article offers an additional perspective on these
issues, not limited to the most recent years of the Court's jurisprudence in the area of financial
markets, largely based on an empirical analysis. Concentrating on the specific field of securities
regulation allows for a more precise judgment on the policy preferences of the Justices vis-i-vis
their overall political views. Aggregating votes in cases from a broad set of areas can in fact hide
some information. For example, a Justice inclined to constrain government intervention in
economic and social issues might, at the same time, be against tight regulation of financial markets
and pro-choice on abortion.
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to test the hypothesis of the influence of political ideology in judicial
decision-making in a crucial area of the economy that no one has
previously examined from this perspective.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I offers a brief overview of
the different systems used for the selection of the judiciary, focusing in
particular on the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, but also
considering other systems adopted for the states' judiciary (including
some comparative insights from other jurisdictions). This Article
underlines the relevance of political considerations in the selection
process, which could influence the ideology of selected Justices and
judges. Part I also discusses more analytically the influence that judicial
interpretation can have in the area of securities regulation. Part II contains
an overview of the existing literature on the correlation between the
ideology of Justices and judges and their positions on the bench. Part II
also explains the most common measures of the elusive concept of
"political ideology" used by social scholars.
The core of this Article's study, and its most important contribution,
is Part III. Section III.A focuses on the methodological approach followed
in collecting and coding the data used in this study, explaining issues such
as the selection of the cases considered for the empirical analysis and the
coding of the decisions and positions of the Justices on the political
spectrum. Section III.B presents the major empirical results. The key
question that this Article attempts to answer is the one anticipated in its
title in a catchphrase: whether conservative Justices are more supportive
of Wall Street and the free market, and liberal Justices more supportive
of investors and regulated markets.
In a recent book, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observed that "the
Supreme Court usually sides with big business and government power
and fails to protect people's rights. Now, and throughout American
history, the Court has been far more likely to rule in favor of corporations
than workers or consumers." 28 In the area of securities regulation, the
distinction is not always as clear because what this Article defines as
"investors" are often also large business enterprises. In addition, this
Article's empirical evidence shows a certain inclination to rule in favor
of business, but also a significant degree of independence of single
Justices who often vote in favor of investors. Professor Chemerinsky's
words, however, offer an interesting commentary on this Article's
findings.
Sections III.B and III.C also use the data collected to explore other
interesting inquiries. For example, Section III.B examines if and how the
"pro-market" attitude of the Court correlates with the evolution of some
general economic variables (i.e., if in times of economic growth and
28.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note

17, at 6.
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bullish markets Justices tend to be more "free-marketers"). Section III.B
also considers if Justices are more consistent in their decisions in this area
when the Court is more divided. Section III.C explores which U.S. Courts
of Appeals the Supreme Court most often overrules.
I. SELECTION OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND IDEOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES
REGULATION DECISIONS

This Part compares different approaches to the selection of members
of the judiciary, primarily focusing on the distinction between politicallybased and merit-based selection processes. It then outlines the
appointment process of Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court and the role
that candidates' ideologies play in this. Lastly, this Part examines the
specific role that ideology plays in the area of securities regulation.
A. An Overview of Different Models for the Selection of the Judiciary
There are many different possible ways to select judges. One major
distinction, from a comparative perspective, is between systems in which
the election or appointment is to some degree "political" (in the sense that
either voters, elected legislatures, or executives play a role in the selection
of the judiciary) and systems that are based solely or primarily on a
technical examination of the legal knowledge of the candidates. Many
different versions of these approaches exist, and the systems often present
both "political" and "technical" elements.
Many countries around the world follow the latter "technical"
approach. This is the case in many civil-law continental European
countries, such as France, Spain, Germany, and Italy. 29 French judge
Jean-Marc Baissus, interviewed by the New York Times a few years ago,
said that the four-day written test to access the French judiciary "gives
you nightmares for years afterwards." 30 It is usually rather young law29. For a comparative overview of some of these systems, see Luis Mufiiz-Arguielles &
Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France, West Germany,
andEngland, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1985); Mary L. Volcansek, Appointing Judges the
European Way, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363 (2007). In the United States, there is scant literature
on the selection of judges and justices in other legal systems. Among the few works that offer
some comparative perspectives, see Epstein, Knight Jr. & Shvetsova, supra note 24; more dated,
but still-interesting short accounts can be read in Wolfgang H. Kraus, Book Review, 48 HARv.L.
REV. 873 (1935) (reviewing R. C. K. ENSOR, COURTS AND JUDGES IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND

ENGLAND (1933)); and William H. Wynne, Book Review, 43 YALE L.J. 862 (1934) (same).
Probably the best recent comparative analysis of different systems to elect judges is: APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate

Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
30. Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/us/25exception.html.
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school graduates intending to enter the judiciary just a few years after
completing their JDs who take this exam. 31 Ostensibly, in this case the
selection ofjudges is less political: a judge's future career often depends
on other more senior judges and, to some extent, on members of the
executive branch, such as the Minister of Justice.32 Even in systems
where the selection ofjudges is accomplished purely through a technical
exam, the election of members of the Constitutional Court is often
different and more political.33 Italy is a good example. The President of
the Republic elects one-third of the fifteen justices sitting on the
Constitutional Court; the Parliament elects one-third; and other judges
elect one-third.34
Often in these systems-again Italy is an illustrative case-the
Constitutional Court only decides issues concerning the constitutionality
of statutes and is the only court with the power of constitutional review;
if lower courts have doubts on the constitutionality of a law, they must
submit a certified question to the Constitutional Court.35 In addition,
specific requirements in terms of actual legal experience are frequently a
condition for appointment on the Constitutional Court.3 6
Justices and judges in the United States also have their nightmares,
but they are of a different fabric than the ones of Judge Jean-Marc Baissus
and his French colleagues. Even if different procedures for selecting state
and federal judges coexist in the United States, they all share a significant
political element: "To the rest of the world, the American adherence to
is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric
judicial elections
37
system."
Historically, after the American Revolution, the greatest concern in
the colonies was to avoid the possible distortions of the English system
in which an absolute monarch could single-handedly appoint and
influence the judiciary. 38 In the early years of the new nation, states
generally opted for judges appointed by elected officials, namely either

31. See Muffiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 29, at 14.
32. See id. at 23 (noting that superiors rarely remove judges once they have been appointed).
33. Volcansek, supra note 29, at 367-68.
34. William J. Nardini, PassiveActivism and the Limits of JudicialSelf-Restraint: Lessons

for Americafrom the Italian ConstitutionalCourt, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 6 n. 14 (1999).
35. See, e.g., id at 6-8.

36. Epstein, Knight Jr. & Shvetsova, supra note 24, at 18.
37. Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1995, 1996 (1988). For a short but witty historical account of the resistance to the adoption of the
metric system in the United States also from a legal point of view, see WEXLER, supra note 14, at
27-38.
38. Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An HistoricalIntroduction, 44 TEX. L. REV.
1081, 1081-82 (1966).
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the legislature or the governor of the state. 39 Some states, however, began
to shift toward popular election of judges in the early nineteenth
century.40 This shift was in part a result of the Populist Movement, which
believed that the people had to elect all public41officials and wanted to
open the judiciary to a broader class of citizens.
After New York switched to election of judges in 1846, most states
entering the Union had an electoral system.4 2 For obvious reasons,
however, widespread dissatisfaction with popular elections developed,
focusing especially on the lack of legal skills of the elected judges and
possible episodes of corruption in the elections.43 Some states tried to
limit the influence of politics on the judiciary by opting for a
"nonpartisan-ballot system," but soon enough this system also showed its
44
limits.

In the 1930s and 1940s, some states began to adopt a version of the
appointment system known as the "merit plan" articulated three decades
earlier by Albert Kales, a professor at the Northwestern University
School of Law.45 Under this approach, even if different variations exist,
a nominating commission (generally composed of both lawyers and
nonlawyers appointed by a variety of sources, such as the governor, the
legislature, the judiciary, and bar associations, among others) provides a
short list of candidates
from among which the governor might choose the
46
actual nominees.
These candidates are often subject to a "retention" election by popular
vote after a limited term like one year in which the voters can choose if
the judge can continue to hold the office. 47 Nowadays approximately twothirds of the states have adopted a merit-selection system, even if it often
coexists with other selection systems sometimes applied for lower
courts. 48 There is an extensive debate on the relative pros and cons of this
39. Matthew Schneider, Why Merit Selection of State CourtJudges Lacks Merit, 56 WAYNE
L. REv. 609, 619 (2010); see also Winters, supra note 38, at 1082.
40. Winters, supra note 38, at 1082.
41. See id. For example, Georgia adopted election ofjudges for some lower courts in 1812,
as did Mississippi in 1832. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1083.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 1084-85.
46. Id. at 1084.
47. Id.
48. See Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64

JUDICATURE 176, 178 (1980) (noting that thirty-one states use commission plans, which assist the
governor in selecting judges); see also Charles McElwee, Merit Selection ofJudges, W. VA. LAW.,
Mar. 1995, at 21, 21; Schneider, supra note 39, at 624. See, e.g., generally Scott G. Hawkins,
Perspective on JudicialMerit Retention in Florida,64 FLA. L. REv 421 (2012) (describing the
history of judicial merit retention elections in Florida and the issues related to that process).
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system versus popular elections.49
For Article III federal judges and Justices, on the other hand, the
Constitution implements a regime of appointment by the President and
confirmation by the Senate, and grants life tenure to the members of the
federal judiciary.5 ° This system appears to share some features with the
merit system, and we believe that it might be a de facto merit system
because even if the President does not formally have to choose among a
preselected list of qualified candidates, political pressure creates a strong
incentive to appoint people with impeccable legal credentials, especially
for the higher courts.
All these different methods to appoint Justices and judges share a
crucial element: they follow an inherently political process. In some
instances the political element might be more explicit, but it is always
present. It is inevitable that popular voters, executives, and legislaturesall political actors-choose judicial candidates based on their ideology,
expecting or at least hoping that their decisions on the bench will reflect
their views as much as possible and contribute to advancing their political
agenda.51 Ideology, in other words, has always played and will always
play a significant role in the selection of the judiciary in the United
States. 52 If ideology plays a role in the selection of the judges, it may also
53
play a role in their judicial decision-making.
Of course Supreme Court Justices, in light of life tenure and the
prestige of the position, are among the most independent (and least
accountable) existing public officers. Even if some nineteenth-century
49. For a recent defense of the merit system, see Frank Sullivan Jr., Assuring Due Process
Through Merit Selection of Judges, 46 IND. L. REV. 123 (2013). For a critique, see Schneider,
supra note 39, at 660, who also questions the constitutionality of merit selection systems; see also
Robert L. Brown, Selection of Judges, 64 ARK. L. REV. 71 (2011); Clifford W. Taylor, Merit
Selection: Choosing Judges Based on Their Politics Under the Veil of a Disarming Name, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97 (2009).

50. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (containing the Appointment Clause); U.S. CONST. art.
III (discussing life tenure). For a discussion of what judicial independence requires in addition to
secure salary and tenure, see Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, FederalJudges and the
Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835 (1995); see
also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of
FederalJudges, 55 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1 (1983). Of course there are some federal judges appointed
in different ways, and without life tenure: consider, for example, bankruptcy courts.
51. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection ofFederalJudges, 36 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 619, 626 (2003).
52. See id. at 621 (arguing that "Presidents and Senates always have considered ideology
in the judicial selection process," and that "the consideration of ideology, by Presidents and
Senates, is desirable"); see also Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical
Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1146 (1988) (arguing that "other dominant factors [in the
judicial selection process] have shifted from sectional and party affiliations to social and judicial
philosophy").
53. See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 621.
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Justices might have used, or tried to use, the Supreme Court as a stepping
stone for further political ambitions;54 such behavior has been extremely
rare in the last century. 55 The very independence of Supreme Court
Justices, however, in many ways allows them to more freely follow their
personal convictions-often the very convictions for which the President
selected them in the first place. Certainly those convictions can evolve or
even change dramatically over time, something to consider in this
analysis. However, the take-away point here is that the very systems used
in the United States to select the members of the judiciary, and of the
Supreme Court in particular, should reasonably be expected to inject a
political and ideological element into the jurisprudence of the courts.
B. Supreme CourtAppointments
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.",56 More precisely, after
the President has made a nomination, the Senate Judiciary Committee
conducts hearings and either rejects or reports the nomination to the full
Senate for a final confirmation vote.57 The procedure set forth in the
Constitution was a last minute compromise at the Constitutional
Convention. 58 Initially, the framers intended to grant the legislature the
power to elect Supreme Court Justices, and only in September 1787 was
the current provision adopted.59
Scholars widely debate the precise scope of the Senate's powers under
the "Advise and Consent" clause, and the Constitution does not offer
much guidance on this issue.6° Some scholars, jurists, and politicians
advocate a restrained role for the Senate, which should only include
inquiring about the candidate's credentials and her professional ethics,
54. Consider, for example, the case of Justice John McLean (one of the two dissenters in
Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 455 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) who, while on the Court, sought three different
presidential nominations from three different parties, as reported by EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra
note 16, at 38.
55. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 39.
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
57. Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth About the Judicial Selection
Process:Each Is Entitled to His Own Opinion,but Not to His Own Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv.

467, 473 (2003).
58. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
ConfirmationProcess, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1496 (1992).
59. Id.at 1496, 1498.
60. See generally Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing
the AppropriateRole of the Senate in the Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1053

(2001).
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deferring to the judgment of the President; others argue the possibility
and desirability of a more active and independent inquiry by the Senate,
which should also consider the political and ideological views of the
nominee. 61 Should even the most restrictive opinion on the role of the
Senate prevail, it would be very difficult to imagine its implementation62
because the boundary between issues relating to a candidate's
professional credentials and his ideology is often blurred. The very
existence of this debate, in any case, seems to confirm the political nature
of the appointment process. In fact, depending on the convenience of the
situation, both liberals and conservatives have argued for either one or
the other approach.63
Since the founding of the United States, the Senate has not been shy
in using its veto power to block Justices due to their judicial ideology. As
early as 1795, the Senate rejected President George Washington's recess
appointment of John Rutledge as Chief Justice primarily because
Rutledge opposed the "Jay Treaty" with England approved by the
Senate. 64 According to some analysis, during the nineteenth century the
Senate rejected twenty-one presidential nominations and, of these

61. Id. at 1055-56. Proponents of a limited Senate role include Bruce Fein. Bruce Fein,
Commentary, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARv. L. REV. 672 (1989).
Conversely, one advocate of a more active investigation is William G. Ross. See William G. Ross,
The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hearings:Proposalsfor
Accommodating the Needs of the Senate andAmeliorating the Fearsof the Nominees, 62 TUL. L.
REV. 109 (1987) (offering an extensive account of Senate confirmation hearings in the twentieth
century and a classification of typical questions). Professor Donald E. Lively also favors an
assertive role for the Senate. Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In
Search of ConstitutionalRoles andResponsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 554 (1986) (favoring
an assertive role for the Senate). Professor Bruce Ackerman defended the nomination of Robert
Bork on the grounds of his professional qualifications, arguing that Bork should have been
evaluated only in this respect. Bruce A. Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1164, 1164 (1988). Supreme Court nominees can elude senators' questions in a number of
ways, often by refusing to answer on the grounds that the issue could come up before the Court.
Refusal to respond is actually grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 455, which provides that "[a]ny justice,
judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
62. Yates & Gillespie, supra note 60, at 1067-68.
63. One additional indicator that the appointment process is highly political is the attempt
by some presidents to sidestep the Senate through the controversial use of recess appointments,
at least for lower federal judges. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, for example, used
this power. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 40, 46. However, the Senate rarely has the opportunity to
inquire deeply into the nomination of lower federal judges in light of the growing number of
judges. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 1508 (noting that, in 1968, there were eighty-three
court of appeals judges; in 1978, ninety-five; and in 1992, one hundred and fifty-four).
64. Lively, supra note 61, at 552.
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rejections, at least seventeen were based on ideological preferences.65
There are also twentieth-century examples of candidates rejected
because of their political views. The Senate rejected John Parker in 1930
largely because of his anti-labor and anti-civil rights positions. 66 Forty
years later, the Senate rejected two Nixon nominees, Clement
Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell, based on their ideological positions
regarding issues such as unions and civil rights. 67 Similarly, in 1987 there
was the famous case of Robert Bork, mentioned at the beginning of this
Article. 68 In some instances, the nomination was withdrawn due to
filibustering. 69 Sharp and sometimes bitter political divisions have often
surrounded the nomination process, even when the Senate eventually
approved nominees. Two symmetrical examples are the appointment by
President Woodrow Wilson in 1916 of Justice Louis Brandeis, opposed
by conservative and pro-business constituencies for his challenges to
corporate practices and his favorable attitude toward laws protecting
employees; and the appointment by President Herbert Hoover in 1930 of
Charles Hughes, chastised by progressives and Democrats because
people viewed him as a lawyer too closely associated with the interests
of large corporations and utility companies. 7 °
Presidents are obviously well aware of the legacy they can create
through a Supreme Court appointment and of how a carefully selected
Justice can continue to project executive policies into the future, long
after the presidents' terms expire. The court-packing plan of President
Franklin Roosevelt, aimed at protecting New Deal legislation from the
prevailing laissez-fairedoctrines of the early twentieth century, is a vivid
illustration of this basic insight.71 President Richard Nixon provided
another example by explicitly stating that his desire to shift the Court on
criminal procedural issues motivated his appointment of Justices Warren
Burger and Harry Blackmun.72 Several authors have expressed the
65. Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings:

Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REv. 913, 944 (1983).
66. Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 625.
67. Id.
68. Id.; supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.

69. This was the case, for example, with the promotion of Abe Fortas to Chief Justice
proposed by Lyndon Johnson, and of nominees Homer Thornberry and, more recently, Harriet
Miers. Jeff Bleich, Advice and Dissent: The Role of Politics in the U.S. Supreme Court

Appointments, OR. ST. B. BULL., Feb.-Mar. 2006, at 19, 19-21 (2006).
70. See Freund, supra note 52, at 1151, 1153.
71. See PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 313 (1999).

72. Conversation with Newsmen on the Nomination of the ChiefJusticeof the United States
May 22, 1969, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NixoN 396

(1971) [hereinafter Conversation with Newsmen]; Herman Schwartz, Justice Blackmun, 43 AM.
U. L. REv. 737, 739 (1994).
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opinion that presidents have been generally successful in shaping the
attitudes of the Court.73
Of course the independence granted to Supreme Court Justices by life
tenure and the prohibition of salary reductions allows some Justices to
become "turn coats." The result is that some appointments do not fulfill
the expectations of the appointing president, but these cases, at least
anecdotally, are quite rare. Probably the most prominent example is Chief
Justice Earl Warren, whose ability to steer the Court toward liberal
positions disappointed President Dwight Eisenhower so much that he
supposedly defined his appointment as "the biggest damnfool mistake I
ever made." 74 In more recent years, Justice Anthony Kennedy, as the
swing vote on the Court, has attracted the ire of conservatives with some
of his votes on gay rights and reproductive issues. 75 Justices Harry
Blackmun, Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter, among others, have
also received similar criticism. The possibility that appointed Justices
shift their position on the political spectrum during their tenure is an
important element that this Article presents with its statistical analysis,
and it suggests some caution in using 76their positions at the time of
nomination as a proxy for their ideology.
The fact that very often in the recent past the party of the nominating
president was different from the party controlling the Senate might
explain the perception that the appointment of Justices has become

73. E.g., Yates & Gillespie, supra note 60, at 1064; Lively, supra note 61, at 555. An
interesting empirical study is Jeffrey A. Segal, Richard J. Timpone & Robert M. Howard, Buyer
Beware?: PresidentialSuccess Through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557
(2000), according to which presidents are generally successful in fostering their agenda through
the Justices they put on the Court, but that over time the position of the Justices often tends to
change from that of the appointing president. Id.at 557. Furthermore, presidents must sometimes
compromise, so they might select a Justice who is expected to vote in a certain way on some
relevant political issues, but might not be aligned with the appointing president on all issues that
come before the Court. One example is Justice Blackmun, appointed by President Nixon also in
light of his positions on criminal law issues, who however did not vote conservatively on abortion
issues. Compare Conversation with Newsmen, supra note 72 (stating President Nixon's hopes
with regard to Justice Blackmun's stance on criminal procedure issues), with Linda Greenhouse,
The Supreme Court: The Legacy; Justice Blackmun's Journey--From Moderate to a Liberal,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/07/us/supreme-court-legacyjustice-blackmun-s-joumey-moderate-liberal.html (discussing Justice Blackmun's liberal stance
on abortion).
74. The story is reported by several sources, with slightly different wording. See JOHN J.
PATRICK, RICHARD M. Pious & DONALD A. RITCHIE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 690 (2d ed. 2001).
75. See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/09/12/swing-shift.
76. See infra Section II.A.
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increasingly divisive and partisan.7 7
Not only has the appointment process seemingly become more and
more politically charged, but the internal functioning of the Court has

also become more divisive. At least two meaningful pieces of evidence
corroborate this perception. The first is the significant increase in the
proportion of decisions containing at least one dissenting opinion since
the 1930s, as clearly illustrated in the empirical literature. 7' The second
the 1990s, as
is the political polarization of judicial clerkships starting in
79

indicated in a fascinating study on Supreme Court clerks.

The appointment process of Supreme Court Justices has always been
politically charged, and the perceived judicial ideology of the nominees
77. See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 625-26. Moreover, as indicated by Professors
David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, between 1969 and 1992 there were eleven consecutive
appointments by Republican presidents, and in eight of these cases the Democratic party strongly
controlled the Senate. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 1493.
78. The following chart indicates the percentage of Supreme Court decisions containing at
least one dissenting opinion from 1801 to 2009. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J.
SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND

DEVELOPMENTS 250-55 tbl.3-2 (5th ed. 2012) (containing data on dissenting opinions for the
terms of the Court covering 1801-2009).
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It is worth noting that there is also evidence of significant disagreement in the nineteenth
century in the private conference of the Court, but back then, the Justices were more reluctant to
publish their dissent. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 67.
79. William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The Liberal
Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship. Its Rise, Fall,and Reincarnation?,62 VAND. L. REv.
1749, 1775 (2009); see also Adam Liptak, A Sign of Court's Polarization:Choice of Clerks, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DOOE4DB 1531 F934A3
575ACOA9669D8B63.
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has always played a crucial role in their ascension to the highest Court.
In the last few decades, the process seems to have become even more
divisive, and the Court itself more polarized along political lines. Against
this background, it is interesting to test if, in the area of financial markets
regulation, conservative Justices have shown a pro-business inclination
in their decisions.
C. Ideology in the Supreme Court's SecuritiesRegulation Decisions
Probably the best evidence that political ideology can play a role in
the area of securities regulation is the set of rules concerning the
composition of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Section
4(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act sets forth that the SEC should be
composed of five members appointed by the President with the "advice
and consent" of the Senate, but also requires that "[n]ot more than three
of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party, and
in making appointments members of different political parties shall be
appointed alternately as may be practicable." 8 ° The statutory call for a
bipartisan SEC indicates that regulation and enforcement activities
markets can be subject to diverging philosophies
concerning the financial
81
along political lines.
It is obviously impossible here to fully discuss the general economic
tenets of conservative and liberal policies with respect to the regulation
of financial markets. General intuition, noted above, is that
''conservative" views of economic policy emphasize the efficacy of
markets over government intervention and regulation, while for liberals
the position is reversed. The consequence is that conservatives tend
toward deregulation based on the conviction that market failures rarely
justify protections for perceived weaker parties in a private transaction.
Liberals, on the other hand, are more skeptical about the virtues of free
markets and believe that regulation should curb the possible inefficient

80. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-281, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78(d) (2012)).
81. See Dan Jamieson, A New BipartisanSEC?, INVESTMENTNEWS (May 26, 2013, 3:31

PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130526/reg/305269978/a-new-bipartisan-sec
(discussing the politics behind selecting candidates for the Commission).
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and inequitable outcomes of laissez-faire market operation.8 2 In short, the
83
former tend to be more "pro-business," the latter more "pro-investor."
An illustration of this possible political divide is the legislative history
of the so-called Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.84 In the
1990s, there was a growing concern that frivolous securities lawsuits
could arise as attorney-driven class actions, in particular invoking section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, forcing defendants to settle
in light of the potential costs of discovery.8 5 Congress created this piece
of legislation to curb such a phenomenon through different measures like
raising the pleading standards.86
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff had to plead false
statements "with particularity," and that pleading had to create a "strong
inference" of scienter, one of the elements of a Rule lOb-5 cause of
82. The literature supporting this assumption is so vast and well-known that it is neither
possible nor necessary here to indicate a complete bibliography. A good in-depth discussion of
how the ideas of Harold Laski (1893-1950), John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), and Friedrik
Hayek (1899-1992) contributed to shape respectively the left, center-left, and right economic
beliefs in Western countries can be found in KENNETH R. HOOVER, ECONOMICS AS IDEOLOGY:
KEYNES, LASKI, HAYEK, AND THE CREATION OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS (Rowman & Littlefield
2003). See also JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: How CONSERVATIVES ABANDONED
THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD Too 50-53, 113, 120-21 (2008) (discussing the
role that Keynes and Hayek had in the economic policies of many presidents in the latter half of
the twentieth century); JAMES J. GOSLING & MARC EISNER, ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN
PUBLIC POLICY 8, 11-12 (2d ed. 2013); JOHN A. ORR, ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM: AMERICAN
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY (2013). More to the point of this Article's focus, see, for example, Martin
Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of ShareholderPrimacy,43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909,
949 (2013) (arguing that the current structure of pension funds has made middle-class Americans
increasingly dependent on the capital gains market).
83. It is important to highlight again that "pro-business" and "pro-investor" are labels used
to simplify the analysis. Perhaps one additional way to explain the different positions would be
distinguishing between pro-free market and pro-regulation. We hold however (and the cases
examined seem to confirm this intuition) that generally a position that broadens the scope of the
regulation, extends private causes of action, and allows more extensive regulatory powers to the
SEC is favorable to investors. In addition, increased regulation represents both a threat and an
opportunity for business. For example, rules prescribing the use of certain environmental-friendly
materials might be a cost for some firms, but a great opportunity for producers of those materials.
84. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For an account of the major
innovations introduced and of the legislative history of the Act, see Jason L. Fowell, Comment,
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Writ for Certiorari,44 S.TEx. L. REV. 809,
815-17 (2003). See also generally Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913 (2003); Marc I. Steinberg, Symposium: Securities
Laws After the PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act-Unfinished Business, 50 SMU L. REV.
9 (1996); and the other contributions published in that symposium issue of the Southern Methodist
University Law Review.
85. See Perino, supra note 84, at 915; Fowell, supra note 84, at 809.
86. See Perino, supra note 84, at 915; Fowell, supranote 84, at 810.
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action; in addition, the court granted a "stay of discovery" before the
decision on the motion to dismiss. 87 Congress enacted the bill into law
over a veto by President Bill Clinton. 88 Numerous Democratic
representatives voted in favor of the law, 89 but the diverging views of
President Clinton and Congress evoke the traditional dividing line
between liberals and conservatives in this area.
This Section briefly addresses the room for policy considerationpolitics-in the enforcement of the securities laws. The intent is not to
offer a comprehensive account of the degree of freedom that courts have
in the interpretation of all the provisions of the securities laws, but more
simply to give a flavor of the possible different interpretations of the
relevant statutes that a particular set of beliefs concerning the proper
scope of the regulation might influence.
To begin, note that the U.S. securities laws enacted in the 1930s were
among the first modem regulations of the financial industry, and they
have served as a model for several foreign jurisdictions. 90 These laws,
however, apply to one of the most dynamic and innovative industries.
Inevitably, enforcing the existing rules to the ever-evolving factual
circumstances that characterize this sector leaves wiggle room for
different policy considerations.
A good starting point is the scope of the securities laws. The definition
of "security" that triggers the obligation to register and disclose
information, as well as the availability of specific private causes of action
designed to protect investors, is broad but also vague. For example,
consider the notion of what constitutes an "investment contract" set forth

87. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), (b)(3) (2012).
88. Fowell, supra note 84, at 819.
89. Ann Morales OlazAbal, False Forward-Looking Statements and the PLSRA's Safe
Harbor, 86 IND. L.J. 595, 616 n.79 (2011) (noting that eighty-nine House Democrats and twenty
Senate Democrats voted to override President Clinton's veto).
90. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L J. 1692,
1711 (2008) (arguing that "[s]ince the SEC has served as the gold standard of securities regulation,
it is not surprising that as the EU has striven to improve and integrate European capital markets,
it has looked to U.S. securities litigation as a model," but also observing that recent economic
developments, and the growth of the financial markets in London, now give more power to the
European Union to influence the SEC); see also Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1508 (2004) (mentioning that Korea has looked to the U.S.
model to regulate its securities markets). But consider also what has been correctly pointed out by
David He, Note, Beyond Securities Fraud: The TerritorialReach of U.S. Laws After Morrison v.

N.A.B., 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 148, 204: "U.S. securities laws--and especially the antifraud
provisions under Section 10(b)--are viewed by many nations as exceedingly intrusive and
burdensome, and numerous governments have openly rejected the U.S. private securities classaction model."
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in section 2 of the Securities Act (and section 3 of the Exchange
Act) that
91
the Supreme Court had to define on various occasions.
Another crucial area concerns the availability of private causes of
action to plaintiff-investors allegedly harmed by false, misleading, or
incomplete statements in the purchase or sale of securities and the burden
of proof that they must satisfy to prevail.92 Furthermore, in several cases,
the remedies granted to plaintiffs are based on private causes of action
implied by the courts and not explicitly regulated by the legislature, most
notably section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act. In these
instances, significant interpretative latitude exists. Consider, for example,
problems such as the need to prove reliance vis-h-vis the fraud-on-themarket theory, the scienter requirement, or the extension of liability to
aiders and abettors. 93 The extension of the insider-trading prohibition, a
rule largely created by courts, is another area in which different
94
ideological perspectives might affect the decision-making process.
Conservatives and liberals also often have divergent views about the
powers of the government (i.e., the SEC) to enforce the law, particularly
the securities laws. For example, some interesting cases in this respect
deal with the burden of proof that the SEC must satisfy to establish a
violation of the securities laws.95
Rulings on takeover regulation also might indicate different policy
preferences of the Justices. These cases, however, show the difficulty of
properly coding certain decisions as pro-business or pro-investor, a
91. Leading cases on this issue are SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391, 395, 397 (2004);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685-87, 697 (1985); International Brotherhood.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556, 558 (1979); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Foreman, 421 U.S. 837, 847, 851-52, 859-60 (1975); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,
297, 301 (1946).
92. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 564, 567, 584 (1995) (discussing the
private cause of action given to plaintiffs when there are misstatements or omissions in a
prospectus and denying that right of action to plaintiffs because recitations in a purchase
agreement did not equate to a prospectus); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1988)
(discussing the use of the in pari delicto defense in a private right of action under the federal
securities laws).
93. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994)
(discussing aiding and abetting liability); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988)
(discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
(1976) (discussing the scienter requirement); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 150-53 (1972) (discussing fraud-on-the-market).
94. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-54 (1997) (describing a broad
understanding of what constitutes fraud); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-60 (1983) (limiting
the scope of liability for insider trading); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229, 232-33
(1980) (discussing the common law and declining to broaden insider trading liability).
95. E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (holding that the SEC has the burden of
proving scienter in certain civil enforcement actions but not others).
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problem that more generally affects the analysis undertaken later in this
Article.96 On one hand, it is possible to argue that takeovers, and more
specifically hostile tender offers, favor investors by allowing them to sell
their shares at a premium over market prices. On the other hand, some
tender offers may not be value-maximizing, and in this case to allow the
target corporation, as well as its controlling shareholders and managers,
to resist an inadequate or coercive offer could be in the best interest of
shareholders.
In any case, the proper role of the market for corporate control and
how to create a level playing field for bidders and targets in the takeover
context are also areas where there is room for competing policy
considerations. 97 In addition, litigation concerning the constitutionality of
state antitakeover statutes is instructive as to the position of the Supreme
Court on issues relating to the relative powers of the federal government
and the states in regulating commerce, an area that implicates the
politically charged question of the role of the federal government.9"
The legislature resolved some of the controversies mentioned above,
and the Court unanimously finds this, easy solution. Even assuming that
ideological preference might be embedded in their decision-making,
judges and, to a lesser but not unsubstantial extent, Supreme Court
Justices face several constraints while speaking from the bench:
Sometimes statutes and regulations are fairly straightforward and do not
leave room for policy considerations; Lower judges might desire not to
be reversed on appeal; 99 Fear of "government retaliation" might play a
role (in the sense, for example, that striking down a statute might lead the
legislature to introduce other measures that the Justice opposes); And
public opinion might unconsciously influence them.
There are, however, several "hard cases" where the solution does not
seem to appear in either the Constitution or in statutory or case law. These
hard cases leave room for the different policy approaches of the decision
maker, as also indicated by the practice of dissenting opinions. This
Article proposes that by examining a significant number of cases, it is
96. See infra Section III.A; see also supra note 83.
97. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8-9, 11-12 (1985) (relying on
the legislative history and purpose of the Williams Act to limit its application); Piper v. ChrisCraft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26-30 (1977) (looking at the legislative history and purposes of the
Williams Act to determine that shareholders are the intended beneficiaries of the Act); Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57-59 (1975) (discussing the purpose of antitakeover
provisions in the Williams Act).
98. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987); Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
99. Of course this element is irrelevant for Supreme Court decisions. As was famously
remarked by Justice Robert Jackson, "We are not final because we are infallible ... we are
infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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possible to detect economic policies preferred by the Justices. In short,
there are problems in the area of securities regulation in which ideology
can play a role, considering the indeterminacy of the applicable laws.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY
IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

This Part begins by discussing the different ways to measure the
elusive concept of ideology. Then, after considering the ideology of the
Justices, this Part explores the correlation between that Justices' ideology
and the way they vote on different decisions.
A. Measures of Justices' ldeology
One of the interesting and challenging problems of any study that
investigates the correlation between the "ideology" of Supreme Court
Justices and their voting patterns is how to precisely code such an
ambiguous and elusive concept as the ideology of each Justice. There are
three major techniques used in the political and legal literature to attribute
a position to Justices (and lower court judges) on the political spectrum:
(1) the party of the appointing president; (2) the Segal-Cover scores; and
the (3) Martin-Quinn scores. The first two are "ex ante" measures
because they classify the Justices based on proxies for their ideology
measured before their tenure on the bench, and they remain static for the
entire period the Justices work on the Court. The last one is an "ex post"
measure, ranking Justices from liberal to conservative based on their
actual voting in published opinions.
The party of the appointing president is probably the most common
measure used to code the political affiliation of Justices. This measure is
based on the assumption that Republican presidents will appoint
conservative Justices and Democratic ones will appoint liberal Justices.
It has several advantages: "it is unambiguous, . . . easy to [apply and]
understand."' 00 It also raises a separate issue: to what extent presidents
are able to effectively influence the activity of the Court.
This measure, however, also has some clear drawbacks. The first
drawback is that, as with all ex ante measures, the measure is static and
does not take into account the possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that
some Justices might change their ideological position during their often
long tenure, as mentioned above.' 01 In fact, empirical literature suggests

100. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 74.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
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on the ideological spectrum
that most Justices "drift" in their position
02
throughout their years on the bench.1
This variable is also problematic because it assumes that all
Republican presidents are conservative and that all Democratic ones are
liberal, or at least that they are all conservative or liberal in the same way,
which is clearly not true. An interesting study ranked the U.S. presidents
from Franklin Roosevelt to Bill Clinton based on their social and
economic liberalism.' 0 3 The ranking is based on a 1995 survey of a
random group of political scientists, and the results-used in this
Article's empirical analysis-are as follows (100 being extremely liberal
and 0 extremely conservative):
Figure 1: Ranking of U.S. Presidents
(Segal, Timpone & Howard, 2000)
90 --

80

718

W.0 78.2

82.5

72

74.3 74.6

70

67

66.4 65.4

1

603

60
44.9 47.7

50

40 -

36.9 38.8

319.338

32.8 33.1

3018 17.6

20 10

0

0 social liberalism U economic liberalism

In addition, not all presidents want or can appoint a Justice who
precisely mirrors their views. 10 4 Other considerations might affect the
decision, such as the need to take into account the geographical origins
of the candidate and-especially in more recent years-the need to create
102. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483,

1485-86 (2007); see also Segal, Timpone & Howard, supra note 73, at 567, 569.
103. Segal, Timpone & Howard, supra note 73, at 560.
104. Consider the case of William H. Taft (1857-1930), a Republican, who, besides being
the only person who served as both President and Chief Justice, was a president who appointed
three Democrats to the Supreme Court. See IRONS, supra note 71, at 261. They were southern
conservatives with which President William Taft had a better relationship than with the
progressives within his own party. Id.
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a diverse Court in terms of gender and race to appeal to part of the
electorate (consider President Ronald Reagan's appointment of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor or President Barack Obama's appointment of
Justice Sonia Sotomayor). Political and party necessities can influence
the President: for example, senators can play a role in the selection,
especially the senator of the same party as the President from the state of
the nominee, though this is more likely to occur in the selection process
for the lower federal courts and is probably less relevant in Supreme
Court nominations. Finally, the President can make a mistake in assessing
the position of the appointee on the political spectrum,' 0 5 or simply may
not care so much. Notwithstanding these caveats, this Article uses the
party of the appointing president as one proxy for the ideology of the
Justices, for the reasons indicated above.
A second very common measure for the ideology of Supreme Court
Justices is the so-called Segal-Cover index.' 0 6 This is also an ex ante
measure that ranks Justices on a conservative-to-liberal spectrum based
on a content analysis of editorials published in two liberal and two
conservative newspapers about the nominees in the period from their
nomination to their confirmation.' 0 7 In its original formulation, to
determine the Segal-Cover index, each paragraph of an article receives a
score: +1 if it indicates a liberal attitude of the candidate, 0 if a moderate
one, or -1 if a conservative one. The position of the Justice is measured
according to the following formula:

I-c

total
In the above formula, "1" is the number of paragraphs indicating a
liberal ideology, "c" is the number of paragraphs indicating a
conservative ideology, and "total" is the total number of paragraphs.
Results can vary between -1 (extremely conservative) and +1 (extremely

105. For a description of these possible mistakes of the ideology classification based on the
party of the appointing president, see EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 71.
106. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of US. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 557, 559 (1989) [hereinafter Ideological Values]; Jeffrey
A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological Values and the Votes
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 813 (1995) [hereinafter Ideological
Values Revisited].
107. Ideological Values, supra note 106, at 559; Ideological Values Revisited, supra note
106, at 813.
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Article has renormalized the score
liberal). In line with other studies, this
10 8
from 0 (conservative) to 1 (liberal).
However, the Segal-Cover index is not devoid of shortcomings. Like
the Republican/Democratic appointing president variable, the SegalCover index is static and does not consider changes in the Justice's
attitudes. A specific bias of this index is that the policies and preferences
of the newspaper influence op-ed pieces on prospective Justices. For
example, there are certain issues that might receive more emphasis than
others, e.g., social issues versus economic ones. In addition, the
newspaper can influence the length of the article and therefore affect the
balance between paragraphs emphasizing a conservative or a liberal
inclination.109
This methodology does not take into account other possible important
sources that indicate the ideology of a Justice, from scholarly articles to
books published before the nomination. 110 Professors Lee Epstein,
William Landes, and Richard Posner have created a more comprehensive
index that also considers
these elements, but this Article does not use it
11
in this analysis.
Another possible bias of the Segal-Cover index is that, in the period
between nomination and confirmation, the authors of the editorials might
write "strategically"--trying to make a candidate appear more liberal and
less self-restrained to enrage Republican Senators, for example. The
Segal-Cover index is, however, popular in the literature, and it has the
advantage of comporting with general scholarly evaluations of the
Justices.11 2 In addition, unlike the party of the appointing president, the
Segal-Cover index ranks the Justices on a continuous scale from -1 to + 1
(or from 0 to +1), offering a more nuanced measure of the position of the
Justices and allowing for more precise correlations.
The most important ex post proxy of the ideology of the Justices is the
Martin-Quinn index. 113 It is based on a classification of the actual votes
108. The normalized measure is that provided in Jeffrey Segal & Albert Cover, Perceived
Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees 1937-2012, STONY BROOK U.,
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/polisci/jsegal/QualTable.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015),
and given by L=I-(CIT), 0<_L:l, where C denotes the paragraphs coded as indicating that the
nominee is liberal, and T, the total number of paragraphs devoted to the Justice. Ideological
Values, supranote 106, at 560 tbl.10.
109. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 73.
110. Id. at 73-74.
111. Id. at 205.
112. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffirey A. Segal, Ideology and the
Study of JudicialBehavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 705, 709-10 (Jon Hanson ed.,
2012).

113. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlofor the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 135 n.1, 145
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of the Justices during their terms, adjusted to take into account possible
alignments among Justices, and it returns an "ideal point" representing a
Justice's ideology in a space ranging from very liberal (-6.656) to very
conservative (3.884).114 This proxy is useful because it accurately
positions the Justices' ideology in different terms and therefore does not
suffer from the static nature of ex ante measures.
The major problem with this approach is its circularity or endogeneity.
Arguably, this measure only shows that a Justice who usually votes
conservative is more likely to vote conservative; it does not provide any
information on the cases in which a Justice, perceived as liberal at the
time of her appointment, voted more conservatively than expected.115
Removing cases on the particular issue researched and evaluating the
correlation between the votes cast in other cases and those the research
focuses on can partially mitigate this problem. For example, if one
intends to test how Justices vote on First Amendment issues, one can
factor in the votes cast in cases not dealing with First Amendment claims
and verify if these votes predict how Justices will vote on First
Amendment controversies.
This Article's analysis of securities regulation decisions uses all these
variables (the party of the appointing president, economic liberalism of
the appointing president, Segal-Cover scores, and Martin-Quinn scores)
to test the existence of a correlation between Justices' ideologies and their
voting behavior. Combining the most commonly used measures
will offer
11 6
important and interesting insights on this Article's query.

(2002) [hereinafter Dynamic Estimation]. See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
Can Ideal Point Estimates Be Used as Explanatory Variables? (Oct. 8, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/media/resnote.pdf.
114. See Dynamic Estimation, supra note 113, at 145. Professor Corey Yung elaborated on
an adjusted variant of the Martin-Quinn index for court of appeals judges. See Corey Rayburn
Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An EmpiricalStudy of the Ideologies of Judges on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1133 (2010).
115. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 75-76.
116. A final observation is that other elements besides the "political position" of the judge
or Justice can play a relevant role in her judicial attitude. For example, Professor and Judge Guido
Calabresi indicated that previous professional experiences might be more relevant than other
considerations: looking at the reversals of criminal convictions by judges of the Second Circuit,
he pointed out how judges who reversed least had come to the bench from the U.S. Attorney's
Office, while judges coming from private practice or academia before appointment reversed more
criminal convictions. Background, sometimes, can trump ideology. Email from Guido Calabresi,
Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Authors (Nov. 12, 2013, 5:51 PM)
(on file with authors).
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B. Studies on the CorrelationBetween Ideology (and Other
Factors)andDecisions
As examined above, the empirical literature of judicial behavior is
vast.1 17 It would be difficult to provide here a complete account of the
numerous studies published by political scientists and legal scholars in
this broad area. This Article therefore limits its overview to some select
works, pointing out in particular how the studies generally indicate a
correlation
between the ideology of Justices and judges and the way they
118
vote.
One of the forerunners of empirical legal studies in this area was
Professor C. Herman Pritchett, who in the 1940s started to keep track of
the votes of the Supreme Court Justices, noting in particular the number
19
of dissents and the allegiances among Justices sharing a political view.
The work of Professor Pritchett attracted a lot of interest as well as
criticism, while several studies have confirmed his intuition that ideology
plays a role in judicial behavior.
The work of Professors Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover offers a good
illustration of the major results of this line of research. In their study, they
coefficient is
find that ideology explains in a robust way (the correlation
120
0.80) the aggregate voting behavior of the Justices.
Many other studies indicate a relationship between the policy
preferences of the Justices and their voting. Ideology might play a role in
the very selection of cases that the Supreme Court will hear. Studies have
found that liberal Justices tend to grant certiorari more often when the
lower court rendered a conservative opinion, and vice versa for
conservative Justices. 121 This is particularly interesting considering that
117. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
118. One excellent summary of the existing literature in this area can be found in EPSTEIN,
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 76-79. The following pages draw much from the overview
they provide.
119. C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of OpinionsAmong Justices of the US. Supreme Court,
1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 890, 891, 893-94 (1941).
120. Ideological Values, supra note 106, at 561. For an illustration of this work in the larger
context ofthe studies on judicial behavior, see Jeffery A. Segal, JudicialBehavior, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND PoLITIcs 20, 26-27 (Keith E. Wittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory
A. Caldeira eds., 2008). Of course statistics imply, by definition, some degree of simplification
and synthesis. More analytical qualitative studies on the behavior of specific Justices often reveal
a more complex picture, and not infrequently contradictory views and positions expressed by one
Justice or judge. An interesting example of such a study is a 1973 article on Justice Douglas's
decisions in the area of taxation: Bernard Wolfinan, Jonathan L. F. Silver & Marjorie A. Silver,
The Behavior of Justice Douglas in FederalTax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 235, 236-37 (1973).
121. See Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States
Supreme Court, 51 J. POL. 828, 828-29 (1989) (observing that numerous studies have determined
that Justices sometimes engage in an "error correcting" strategy and will grant certiorari because
they believe the court of appeals' judgment was wrong); Gregory Caldeira & John Wright,
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according to other studies, Justices want to hear cases they intend to
reverse, and in fact empirical evidence indicates that between 1953 and
1994 the Supreme Court reversed the majority of the decisions it
reviewed (61.3 %).122
Especially since the 1960s, conservative Justices have been
proportionately voting to overturn more liberal precedents and strike
23
down more liberal statutes, and the opposite is true for liberal Justices. 1
Other studies have shown an inclination of some Justices to vote for the
defendants in criminal law cases if the litigation involves either statutory
issues, which suggests coherence with a
interpretation or Constitutional
124
particular ideological view.
At least one empirical study has also examined the interpretative
techniques employed by the Justices-in particular their use of legislative
history. According to its authors, not only are liberal Justices more likely
than conservative ones to use this interpretative technique, but Justices
are more inclined to refer to legislative history "when it favors their
ideologically preferred outcomes. ' 125
Another line of research investigates the sensitivity of the Supreme
Court to external pressures, whether real or perceived. While these
studies do not examine the role of ideology in the Supreme Court's
decisions, they are relevant because they seem to confirm that Justices
pay attention to extra-legal considerations, which might be a way that
politics influence them. For example, one research study shows that when
there is an ideological difference between the Court and Congress, the
Court is less likely to invalidate a federal statute, which might be a
concern for possible "retaliations" from Congress-either enacting a new
statute with similar effects or other possible actions such as a reduction

OrganizedInterests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court,82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1109,

1112-14 (1988) (expanding on the idea that Justices are more likely to grant certiorari for a case
they disagree with ideologically and asserting that amicus briefs help Justices determine when
they disagree with a lower court decision for ideological reasons); see also Ryan J.Owens, The
Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54 AM. J.POL. Sci. 412, 424 n.26

(2010) (observing that Justice White frequently dissented from the Court's denials of certiorari
because of ideological disagreements with the lower courts).
122. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 27.
123. See Lori A. Ringhand, JudicialActivism: An EmpiricalExaminationof Voting Behavior

on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 45 (2007); Jeffrey A. Segal & Robert
M. Howard, How Supreme CourtJustices Respond to Litigant Requests to Overturn Precedent,
85 JUDICATURE 148, 157 (2001).
124. See Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court's
CriminalDocket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 96-98 (2005).

125. David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use
of Legislative History, 51 WM. &MARY L. REv. 1653, 1740 (2010).
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of the Court's budget. 126 More generally, other works find that the
Justices are responsive to changes in the public opinion.' 27 Even more
central to the topic of this Article is the finding that the Supreme Court
reacts to the business cycle, for example by siding with the government
in times of economic growth and tending to rule against it during
economic downturns, but deferring to government efforts in times of
crisis. 128 The instant empirical analysis has tested the hypothesis that
Court decisions in securities regulation cases have some correlation with
economic conditions.129
Scholars have conducted extensive research on lower court decisions,
focusing on decisions of the federal courts of appeals. Of course, the
institutional context is different in such cases. Federal judges can face
more constraints than Supreme Court Justices in their decision-making
for reasons that this Article has already mentioned (fear of reversal, hopes
of elevation to a higher court, etc.). It is important to note, however, that
even with respect to lower federal judges, there are strong indicia that
ideology affects judicial decision-making.
For example, judges close to the Democratic Party vote more
consistently against corporations in antitrust cases and for unions in labor
disputes.' 3 ° An article on the Chevron doctrine claims that "panels
controlled by Republicans were more likely to defer to conservative
agency decisions (that is, to follow the Chevron doctrine) than were the
panels controlled by Democrats." ' 31 Similarly, "Democrat-controlled
panels were more likely to defer to liberal agency decisions than were
those controlled by Republicans."' 3 2 In addition, according to a study of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, conservative Justices
tend to align their votes 33with conservative judges, and liberal Justices and
judges similarly align. 1

126. Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme
Court, andJudicialReview: Testing a ConstitutionalSeparationof Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 89, 90 (2011).

127. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does PublicOpinion Influence the Supreme Court?
Possibly Yes (But We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 263 (2010).

128. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L. J. 1191, 1196-97, 1219 (2009).
129. See infra Figure 7.
130. See Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts ofAppeals, 19611964, 60 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 374, 376 tbl. 1, 380 tbl.5 (1966).

131. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175
(1998).
132. Id.
133. MARVIN SCHMCK, LEARNED HAND's COURT 345-46 (1970).
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There is also evidence of constraints on judicial behavior and of
strategic voting. District court judges are adverse to reversal, or at least
to a high frequency of reversals, and in their voting they seem to take into
account the policy preferences of the court that will hear an appeal. On
average, judges appointed by a Democratic president tend to impose
lower prison sentences if a mostly liberal court of appeals reviews them
and longer ones if the appellate judges are mostly Republican. 134 Also,
researchers have tested "panel effects": male judges seem more likely to
vote for women in employment discrimination disputes if a woman is on
the panel, 135 while white judges more frequently
vote in favor of voting
36
rights if a black judge sits on the panel.1
Researchers have also conducted important studies on state judges,
especially to investigate the behavior of elected judges. Elected judges
rule more frequently in favor of in-state plaintiffs and against out-of-state
businesses than appointed judges, especially when the decision transfers
wealth to the state. 1 37 Additionally, sentences in violent criminal cases
are more severe if the judge is approaching reelection.' 38 Statistically,
state supreme court justices are more
likely to confirm death sentences
139
when the electorate supports them.
This brief overview of some contributions indicates evidence that
ideology informs judicial decisions and that judges take into account
external variables like the panel composition, public opinion, Congress's
political composition, fear of reversal, and economic cycles. The results
of previous research make interesting and relevant the questions that this
empirical analysis investigates in the next Part, in particular whether the
ideology of the Justices plays a role in securities regulation disputes.

134. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: PositivePolitical Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 52-53
(2007). See generally Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in

the U.S. District Courts,36 AM. POL. REs. 669, 669 (2008) (discussing whether district courts are
influenced by anticipated responses of courts of appeals).
135. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untanglingthe CasualEffects of
Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390 (2010).
136. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 45 (2008).
137. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort
Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 341, 367 (2002).
138. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability andCoercion: Is Justice Blind
When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004).
139. See Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives:Elections and JudicialPolitics in
the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 496-97 (1995); cf Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven

Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship Between JudicialElections
and CapitalPunishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 611-12, 637 (2002) (stating that

trial judges are more likely to impose the death penalty in election years than in nonelection years).
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III. AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN
THE SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES REGULATION DECISIONS

This Part discusses the empirical research that is the focus of this
Article, including the methodologies used to collect the data. In addition
to a general discussion of the methods and findings, it also analyzes the
correlation between the ideology of Justices and their decision-making
based on the data. Finally, this Part ends by considering the Justices rate
of reversal of different cases depending on the court of appeals from
which the case originates. This discussion paves the way for further
research.
A. MethodologicalIssues: The Data
This Section explains the major methodological underpinnings of the
empirical research that follows. The table in the Appendix of this Article
contains the most important data that we have used; hereinafter we
discuss how we selected, collected, and coded that data.
The first-and a most important-issue that we faced was the
selection of cases. We selected forty-eight Supreme Court decisions,
listed in the Appendix in alphabetical order by the name of the parties,
from the 1930s through 2011-a time span that covers almost the entire
existence of the securities laws. We did not select a random sample of
cases but rather included what we consider the most significant cases
decided by the Supreme Court in that period of time. 140 From a statistical
point of view, therefore, our response to the objection that we did not
work on a random sample is that we considered the entire population of
the most important decisions. Of course, to single out a decision as
particularly important, and warranting of inclusion in our data, is a
judgment call. Possible criticisms of our selection are that we neglected
some other important decisions or that we included some cases that are
not particularly relevant. Those criticisms are helpful to update this
Article's list of cases in the future. However, our selection seems at least
partially validated by the generally significant number of citations to the
selected cases, 14 1 by the fact that major securities regulation casebooks
include an excerpt or discussion of most of them,1 42 and leading treatises
140. We had to exclude from the empirical analysis, however, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1
(1936), because some of the proxies for the Justices' ideologies are not available for that year.
141. According to a search on Westlaw, courts have cited the cases in this Article's data an
average of 824 times per case, and legal journals have cited them an average of 590 times per
case.

142. E.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
(12th ed. 2009); JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT,

MATERIALS

SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

1271-80 (3d ed. 2001);

LARRY D. SODERQUIST
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refer to them. 143 We have also informally submitted the list of cases to
several securities regulation scholars and experts who have confirmed
that the selection covers the most important cases. 144 We believe that
focusing on the most relevant cases can lead to more useful insights on
the issues this Article investigates. Even more importantly, we must note
that even considering the most complete lists of securities regulation
cases decided by the Supreme Court, depending on the database
considered, our selection covers in between 75% and 94% of the total
number of decisions. This makes the selection extremely significant and
basically excludes possible bias.
We did, however, include cases that resulted in a split Court or had
some dissents as well as cases that were unanimously decided, contrary
to other studies that only focus on decisions with some dissents, assuming
that those are the "hard cases" that leave more room for judicial activism
and are more politically divisive. We believe that ignoring unanimous
decisions might cause a bias that tends to undervalue the situations in
which all Justices share one interpretation independently of their political
position when the law is less ambiguous.
One objection to the analysis could be that we analyzed a limited
number of cases. We have several responses to this criticism. First, as
mentioned, we examined the entire (or almost) population of relevant
cases. Second, forty-eight cases is a statistically significant number. Third
and more importantly, the number of single observations is in fact
significantly higher because for each case there were typically nine votes
(sometimes slightly less if not all of the Justices participated in the
decision).
The table in the Appendix provides, after the citation and date, a very
short holding of the case, often taken almost verbatim from the actual
decision. This has sometimes raised a difficult issue because some cases
have more than one holding, and the different holdings might not go in
the same direction (for example, when they are not both pro-business). A
good example is Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 145 which ruled both on the
& THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION xxv-xxviii (6th ed. 2006); THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ix-xx (7th ed. 2006).
143. E.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (6th ed.
2009); MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW (5th ed. 2009); STEPHEN J. CHOI &
A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2008); LARRY D.
SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 205-07 (4th ed. 2011).

144. We have informally shared our list of cases with Professors Franklin A. Gevurtz, Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Marc 1. Steinberg, and Steven Thel, and they have all indicated that the list
appears to include all the most important cases decided by the Supreme Court in the area of
securities regulation (emails on file with the Authors). Obviously, their consideration of the list is
just one additional element to validate it, but all errors and omissions are entirely ours.
145. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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concept of materiality of information (adopting, in cases of merger
negotiations, the "probability-magnitude" test and rejecting the
"agreement-in-principle" test) and on the proof of reliance (adopting the
"fraud-on-the-market" theory) in 1Ob-5 actions. 146 In these limited cases,
depending on the circumstances, we have either taken into account the
different holdings or concentrated on the most important one by which
the Court has affected the law, for instance in resolving a split among
circuit courts, deciding an issue of first impression, or reversing or
distinguishing from a precedent decision.
The sixth column indicates our coding of the case as pro-business or
pro-investor. This coding decision is extremely delicate. Generally
speaking, we coded a decision as pro-business where the Court ruled in
favor of the business defendant and against private investor-plaintiffs or
the SEC. In most of the pro-investor decisions, the Court has interpreted
broadly the scope of application of the securities laws, for example
requiring the registration of a specific transaction (see SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co. 147). In other decisions, the Court has ruled in favor of
investors on liability issues, for example implying a private cause of
action (see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,148 establishing a cause of action for
misstatements in a proxy solicitation 149), or it has eased the burden of
proof for the plaintiff (consider again Basic, facilitating the proof of
reliance 5 °). The opposite is true for pro-business decisions. A recent
example of a pro-business decision is Morrison v. National Australia
Bank,1 5 1 which, excluding the extraterritorial application152of the securities
laws, has barred foreign-cubed securities class actions.
Some cases are either particularly difficult to code as pro-business or
pro-investor or at least require adopting a controversial thesis (or some
simplifying hypothesis, or both) to code them. This is particularly true in
two areas: takeover regulations and insider trading. For example, the
Court in one famous case held that a state antitakeover statute was
constitutional because it did not violate the Commerce Clause and the
146. Id. at 249-50. This second holding of Basic is an interesting example in terms of
possible ideological underpinnings of the Court's reasoning. The majority opinion uses a theory
generally embraced by supporters of free markets to reach a result that is protective of investors.
To simplify, by arguing that the efficiency of the market allows all publicly available information
to be incorporated and reflected in market prices, it concludes that plaintiff-investors do not need
to prove actual reliance on misstatements because in trading in securities they rely on market
prices affected by the misstatement. Id.
147. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
148. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
149. Id. at 431-32.
150. Basic, 485 U.S. at 250.
151. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); id. at 2894 n.11 (Breyer, J., concurring).
152. See id. at 2884-85, 2888 (majority opinion); id. at 2894 n.11 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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securities laws-specifically the Williams Act-did not preempt it.153
Upholding antitakeover statutes might be pro-business if one subscribes
to the idea that hostile tender offers tend to favor shareholders, allowing
them to pocket a premium over market prices. On the other hand, some
scholars argue that at least some antitakeover defenses can help
management to fend off takeovers that are not value-maximizing, thereby
allowing state legislatures to provide for stronger protections of the
54
corporate bastion that can, at least in some situations, favor investors. 1
This Article generally takes the position that decisions favoring an
active market for corporate control are favorable to investors, but some
cases proved not to fit this conclusion. A good illustration is Piper v.
Chris Craft Industries, Inc., 55 decided in 1977. In that case, the Court
held that a defeated tender offeror has no private cause of action for
damages against a competitive bidder and the target corporation for
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection
with a tender offer under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.156 We considered this case not favorable to investors because
reducing protections for a competitive bidder might negatively affect the
possibility of a price-maximizing auction among bidders. More
generally, strict scrutiny of possible misstatements in the takeover context
is at least indirectly beneficial to investors. We acknowledge, however,
that there might be different interpretations of the effects of the decision.
For example, one might argue that the decision favors investors because
the target can escape liability, and therefore there is no payment of
damages to third parties reducing the value of the target's shares.
Professor Harold J. Spaeth's coding of the case as conservative supports
our view. 157
153. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
154. Classical works considering the effects of takeovers and discussing whether the market
for corporate control should be facilitated are Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case Against Board
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 973, 975 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028, 1030 (1982); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates 1V & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
StaggeredBoards: FurtherFindings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,55 STAN. L. REv.

885, 887 (2002); John C. Coffee Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome
of CorporateControl Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605, 607 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,

94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 862 (1981); Ronald
J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP.L. 491,
492 (2001); Jeffrey N. Gordon, "JustSay Never? " PoisonPills,DeadhandPills,and Shareholder

Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 511, 514 (1997); Martin
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 105 (1979).
155. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
156. Id. at 47.
157. Data, SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited May 1, 2015).
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Insider trading cases might also be ambiguous because some scholars
have famously argued that to allow some trading by insiders actually
increases the information efficiency of the market. 158 A delicate decision
in this respect is Dirks v. SEC1 59 in which the Court denied insider-trading
liability in a situation where the tipper acted with the goal of exposing a
fraud and derived no personal gain from the tip.' 60 We have, however,
generally followed the rationale that cases reducing the scope of
application of insider trading favor business and that investors are better
off with strict enforcement of the prohibition. 16 1 For this reason, we have
coded Dirks as a pro-business decision, and once again we find support
in Professor Spaeth's database,
the Supreme Court Database that lists the
62
decision as conservative.'
Other cases present some element of ambiguity. One last example is
a decision holding that predispute agreements to arbitrate controversies
between investors and financial intermediaries are enforceable,' 63 a
decision we coded as pro-business because, if nothing else, the investor
was claiming that the arbitration clause was not enforceable. 164 It is
questionable that arbitration is less effective in protecting investors than
litigation in federal courts, but this Article's hypothesis is that leaving
investors the choice of suing in court or arbitration is more favorable to
them.
It would be impossible to discuss all the cases in the list here. The
general point this Article makes is that while most decisions are easy to
classify as either pro-business or pro-investor, there are some
controversial cases that required a judgment call on which reasonable
minds can disagree. We are relatively confident, however, that our coding
158. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fishel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 861 (1983); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23
VAND. L. REv. 547, 565 (1970). Empirical studies, however, seem to indicate that insider trading
does not significantly affect market prices. Joel Seligman, The Reformation ofFederalSecurities
Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1096 (1985). For a recent and
comprehensive overview of insider trading regulation in the United States, and the underlying
theories on which it is based, see WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING
(3d ed. 2010).

159. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
160. Id. at 665-67.
161. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary
Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 144, 144 (2005) ("[C]ountries with more.
prohibitive insider trading laws have . . . more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock
markets. These findings are generally robust to controlling for measures of disclosure and
enforceability and suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrent components)
matter to stock market development.").
162. Data, supra note 157.
163. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,480 (1989).
164. Id. at 479.

IDEOLOGY AND THE SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES REGULATION DECISIONS

is fairly accurate. Furthermore, even if the classification is debatable in a
small number of cases, this should not significantly affect the results of
the empirical analysis.
One caveat is necessary: we have used the labels pro-investor and probusiness because they convey the underlying idea of this Article's
analysis. A different expression, however, could be more accurate, such
as "pro-regulation" and "anti-regulation." In several cases, the plaintiff is
itself a business organization, such as an investment fund or another
corporation, and some decisions coded "pro-investor" might be favorable
1 65
to particular kinds of businesses that can also be "investors."
Notwithstanding this observation, the pro-investor/pro-business
distinction captures in a brief and somehow catchy label the distinctions
explained in this paragraph. Like all labels, however, one should not read
this one too literally.
The pro-business/pro-investor distinction often overlaps with the
conservative/liberal one. For example, a position favoring the expansion
of the powers of the federal government or judiciary vis-A-vis the states
might be considered liberal but may actually favor business. Consider
legislation limiting the ability of private plaintiffs to bring securities
claims in state courts.166 As a control variable in our analysis, next to the
column coding for pro-business or pro-investor in the table in the
Appendix, we have indicated the coding of the decision as liberal or
conservative
based on the Supreme Court Database created by Professor
16 7
Spaeth.
In the overwhelming majority of the cases, our classification of a
decision as pro-investor coincides with the Supreme Court Database's
coding as liberal; similarly decisions we considered pro-business are
usually deemed to be conservative in the Supreme Court Database, but
there are some limited exceptions. One such case is Chiarellav. United
States,168 a leading case in which the Supreme Court reversed a criminal
conviction for an insider-trading violation, reasoning that the mere
possession of nonpublic, price-sensitive information is not sufficient to
165. In some pro-investor cases, the Court found in favor of a small investor against a large
corporate defendant; however, in many cases the investor is a large financial institution or
business entity.
166. We refer to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, enacted to prevent
the circumvention of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; on this piece of
legislation, see David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform
StandardsAct of 1998: The Sun Sets on California'sBlue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1, 2-4 (1998)
For a more recent evaluation of the effects of the statute, see Gregory Kendall, Comment, The
Artful Dodgers:Securities Fraud,Artful Pleading,andPreemptionof State Law Causes ofAction

Under the SecuritiesLitigation Uniform StandardsAct, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 657, 657-58 (2012).
167. See Data, supra note 157.
168. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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impose liability and that a breach of a fiduciary duty is also a necessary
element of the violation.' 6 9 In other words, the holding in Chiarella
rejected the "parity-of-information" theory of insider trading. 170 This
decision, favorable to a criminal defendant, has understandably been
labeled liberal in the Supreme Court Database, but we find that limiting
the scope of the insider trading liability can, at least generally, favor
managers or employees who are insiders, hurt the general public of
investors, and diminish their confidence in financial markets. We
therefore treat some of these decisions as pro-business.'71 Of course, this
is yet another judgment call. We are in any case comforted by the fact
that only seven cases involve discrepancies between our coding and
Professor Spaeth's.
The Appendix contains the data described above for the reader's
convenience. To avoid making the Appendix too cumbersome, it does not
include the data discussed below, 172 which are easily obtainable from
publicly available sources.
For each decision, we have listed the Justices and indicated the three
variables used to classify their ideology: the party of the appointing
president, the Segal-Cover scores, and the Martin-Quinn scores. We
have already discussed these measures and their pros and cons, and
therefore do not need to further elaborate on those measures here. 173 Note,
however, that next to each president we have also indicated-when the
data is available-their position on the conservative to liberal spectrum
on economic issues according to the previously cited study by Professors
Jeffrey Segal, Richard Timpone, and Robert Howard. 174 We will use this
measure to examine more precisely the possible connection between the
economic policy preferences of the appointing presidents and the
behavior of their appointees.
For each Justice in each decision, we have indicated whether that
Justice voted with the majority (taking either a pro-business or proinvestor position), has dissented, or has not taken part in the decision. We
have not distinguished between regular and special concurring

169. Id. at 224, 226-28, 235; Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary
Principle:A Post-ChiarellaRestatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 17 n.68 (1982); Anthony Michael
Sabino & Michael A. Sabino, From Chiarella to Cuban: The Continuing Evolution of the Law of
Insider Trading, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 673, 693-94, 718 (2011).
170. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 235.

171. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Data, supra note 157 (containing data of the aforementioned Supreme Court
Database); EPsTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 78; MARTIN-QuINN ScoREs,
http://mqscores.berkeley.edu (last visited May 1,2015).
173. See supra Section II.A.
174. Segal, Timpone & Howard, supra note 73, at 560.
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opinions, 17 5 but simply listed the votes as supporting the majority or
plurality decision or dissenting from it based on data from the Supreme
Court Database. While this choice disregards valuable information for a
more in-depth legal analysis of the relevance of the decision and its
binding value as precedent, considerations of simplicity in the empirical
analysis prevailed.
We then collected information concerning the Chief Justice to
consider to what extent different Chief Justices were able to influence or
steer the Court toward their positions or, more simply, under which Chief
Justices the Court leaned more toward a pro-business or pro-investor
agenda. The Chief Justice is a primus inter pares. He is the first one to
speak at the Justices' conference discussing the cases after oral argument
and, if he is in the majority, he assigns the opinion. But besides that and
his ability to persuade his colleagues, his vote has exactly the same value
as the votes of the other Justices.
Finally, we considered the circuit court from which the case arose and
whether the Supreme Court reversed, affirmed, or vacated and remanded
the case. The data are taken from the Supreme Court Database and
Westlaw. This study focuses on Supreme Court Justices and therefore
does not consider the ideological composition of the lower courts. It
would be interesting, however, to confirm whether the Court reverses
some circuits more often than others in securities disputes. Such a
correlation might be a first step for future research into related questions.
One such related question might be whether the Supreme Court is more
deferential to the Second Circuit in light of the significant number of
cases concerning financial markets regulation that this court decides.
B. Results: General Patterns
In the following pages, this Article provides the results of the analysis.
This Section discusses some general empirical findings. The next Section
focuses on the correlation between the Justices' ideology and their voting
patterns. In the final Section, this Article offers some information on the
rate of reversal correlated to the circuit court from which the case arose.
Figure 2 below simply indicates the overall number of cases decided that
were pro-business and pro-investor in the period considered.

175. A special concurring opinion is written when the Justice agrees with the disposition of
the case by the majority, but not with its reasoning.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Cases Across Pro-Business and Pro-Investor
Holdings
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While not particularly telling with respect to the key questions this
Article raises, it is interesting that the Court has ruled more often in favor
of business by a ratio of three to two. In this perspective, the data seem
to confirm the6 concerns of Professor Chemerinsky mentioned in the
7
Introduction.
The distribution of pro-business and pro-investor decisions over time
is also thought provoking. Figure 3 breaks down the data in terms of the
tenures of the Chief Justices.

176. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Cases Across Pro-Business and Pro-Investor
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Two important caveats are necessary. First, Chief Justice Warren
Burger's Court decided few securities regulation cases, making the
percentage less meaningful. Therefore, the data are more interesting for
the last three periods, meaning from the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
Courts. Second, as this Article mentioned before, the Chief Justice is
simply a first among peers: each time the President appoints a new Justice
to the Court, the Court changes ideological composition. For this reason,
it might make sense to divide the timeline into as many periods as
different compositions of the Court have occurred. Nonetheless, the
division by Chief Justices' tenures gives a sense of the evolution of the
Court and is a common and accepted means to distinguish different
"periods" of the life of the Court (for example, commentators speak of
the "Roberts Court" and the "Warren Court").
Given the limited number of cases decided during the tenure of Chief
Justice Burger, let us focus on the last three periods. Here, it is intriguing
to observe that, in securities regulation issues, the Rehnquist Court
appears to be less conservative-less pro-business-than the Burger
Court, which has a record similar to that of the pre-2011 Roberts Court.
Looking at the general trend, it seems that over time the Court shifted to
a more pro-business position, starting approximately in the early 1970s.
This evolution seems consistent with the appointment of Justices Harry
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist by President Richard
Nixon in 1970 and 1971 and the shift of the Court to more conservative
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positions. We are cautious, however, in drawing any particular inference
from these still-aggregate data.
Figure 4 indicates the percentage of cases (separating pro-business
and pro-investor decisions) with at least one dissenting opinion during
the tenures of the seven Chief Justices who served in the period covered
by our research.
Figure 4: Percentage of Cases in Pro-Business and Pro-Investor Holdings
with Dissent
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This graph confirms, by the significant number of dissents, that
securities regulation cases are often controversial, or at least that Justices
are likely to voice their dissents. This might also be partially due to the
fact that the Court has been deciding relatively fewer cases in total in
recent decades, and therefore Justices might simply have more time to
write separate opinions. 77 But the finding is not inconsistent with the
perception of a divided Court.
In this perspective, it is also interesting to look at the percentage of
dissents in pro-business and pro-investor decisions. Figures 5 and 6 offer
insights in this respect.

177. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 107 (1985); GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 79-80 (1976).
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Fiure
5:Disnents
in Pro-Business
Decisions
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F~ure6:Dissents
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(5%)

SDissents
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The pie charts indicate, interestingly enough, that pro-business
decisions appear to be more controversial: in pro-business decisions,
Justices have prepared three or four dissents in fifty-one percent of the
cases, while only twenty percent of the cases in pro-investor decisions
have three or four dissents.
Next, this Article investigates economic conditions under alternative
Court decisions, looking at some economic indicators at the time of probusiness or pro-investor decisions.1 78 Figure 7 below illustrates the
results. In Figure 7, each bar indicates the average value of the economic
variable below when either pro-business or pro-investor decisions were
rendered. For example, with "Inflation," the graph indicates that, on
average, when the Court handed down pro-business decisions, inflation
was higher than when pro-investor decisions were rendered. More
precisely, to avoid scale differences across the economic variables, for
each economic variable that prevails under pro-business or pro-investor
decisions, Figure 7 reports the average ratio of the full sample. Where the
ratio is greater than 1, the implication is that, on average, the economic
variable for that class of court decision (pro-business or pro-investor)
assumes a value higher than the full sample average for that economic
variable. Conversely, where the ratio is less than 1, the implication is that,
on average, the economic variable for that class of court decision (probusiness or pro-investor) assumes a value lower than the full sample
178. Economic data sources are as follows: inflation data for the consumer price index is
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; GDP data was sourced from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis; the public (domestic and foreign) debt to GDP ratio was sourced from
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF

FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); the Dow Jones Index was sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis historical data series; and long term interest rates were obtained from Lawrence H.
Office, What Was the InterestRate Then?, MEASURING WORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com
/interestrates/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
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average for that economic variable. For instance, in the case of
"Inflation," the first two bars indicate that, on average, when pro-business
decisions were rendered, inflation was approximately 20% higher than
Figure 7: Economic Conditions under Alternative Court Decisions
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the full sample average inflation rate; when pro-investor decisions were
rendered, inflation was approximately 20% below the full sample
average.
Because we are employing economic averages across substantial time
periods, the analysis aggregates away any nuances that may attach to
subperiods in the sample-an unavoidable constraint given the relatively
small number of cases per subperiod.
The results indicate that the Court is more likely to rule in favor of
business when inflation, interest rates, and gross domestic product (GDP)
growth (both nominal and real) are high, and the ratio of public debt to
GDP and growth rate in the Dow Jones index is low.
First, conditions of relatively high inflation, associated economic
policy responses in the form of higher interest rates, and low growth rates
in the Dow Jones index all indicate conditions of pressure (though not
necessarily crisis) on asset markets and on net wealth positions of voters.
Under these conditions, the Court appears to favor business in its
rulings.1 79 Second, the increasing propensity of the Court to favor
179. This has an immediate counterpart in the idea that concerns over inflation influence
Republican voters more, while Democratic voters are more susceptible to concerns over
unemployment.
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investors under a rising ratio of public debt to GDP is consistent with at
least two explanations.
Increased public debt levels could be indicative of a more
interventionist economic policy environment-either as an expression of
countercyclical stimulatory fiscal policy (as was in place post-2007, for
example) or by virtue of a greater commitment to the public provision of
goods and services. The Court may simply be reflecting this broader
policy preference. Alternatively, a rising debt to GDP ratio implies that
the future expected tax burden has to increase symmetrically. The Court's
favoring of investors may reflect a concern for this increased expected
tax burden.
Finally, the finding that pro-business decisions correspond to periods
of high economic growth is consistent with the finding in the literature
that the Court reacts to the business cycle.' 80 It appears that where
economic conditions are improving more rapidly, the Court is less
disposed to impose additional regulation on the operation of business than
it may be under less favorable economic conditions.
There might be different ways to interpret the data that do not imply
that economic conditions affect Justices when they render their decisions.
For example, a higher percentage of pro-investor decisions at times of
higher Dow Jones growth could simply mean that in periods of market
euphoria more investors are lured to invest in securities, and statistically
it is more likely that some of them are victims of illegal practices. 181
C. CorrelationsBetween Justices'Ideology and Voting
This Article finally addresses the key issue: whether conservative
Justices are more pro-business and liberal Justices more pro-investor. The
following graph, Figure 8, offers an important insight.

180. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
181. Admittedly, to argue that Justices take into account, for example, the level of inflation
when deciding a case might seem questionable because some of the cases decided present very
unique factual pattems that are difficult if not impossible to link to general economic conditions.
It seems interesting however, that the evidence indicates-consistent with previous literaturethat there is a correlation between general economic conditions and the propensity of the Court to
rule in favor of business or investors.
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Figure 8: Distribution of Conservative and Liberal Justice Votes Across
Pro-Business and Pro-Investor Votes

0'**
Conservative

Liberal
Business 1. Investor

In this case, we have classified Justices as conservative or liberal
based on the party of the appointing president, a coding that-for the
reasons discussed above-is somewhat rough and simplistic, but still
compelling. The results strongly support our hypothesis: conservative
Justices vote consistently more pro-business (in 58% of the cases) than
liberal Justices (in 60% of the cases, they vote pro-investor).
Figure 9, below, refines this inquiry by coding the Justices based on
the position of the appointing president on the liberal to conservative
continuum for those
presidents for which this information is available, as
82
discussed above.'

182. See supra Figure 1; supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Figure 9: Percentage Votes Pro-Business Against Appointing President
Economic Liberalism Score
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As discussed above, the Segal-Cover score varies between 0 (very
conservative) and +1 (very liberal). The graph indicates a meaningful
correlation: more conservative Justices more frequently voted probusiness, and more liberal Justices more often voted in favor of investors.
Moreover, variations in the Segal-Cover score account for approximately
27% of the variation in the percentage of pro-business decisions across
all Justices in the sample. Considering the constraints that even the
Supreme Court faces in judicial decision-making in terms of precedents
and statutory interpretation, this is a rather strong indicator of a
correlation between ideology and voting.
Figure 11 examines the percentage of pro-business decisions against
the Martin-Quinn scores of each Justice at the time of the decision.
Figure 11: Percentage Votes Pro-Business Against Average Justice
Martin-Quinn Score
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For this analysis, we used the average Martin-Quinn score over the
relevant period for each Justice because we needed to correlate that data
with the percentage of pro-business votes of the Justice. Bearing in mind
that the Martin-Quinn score varies from very liberal (-6.656) to very
conservative (+4.3999),183 we find a positive correlation between the
position of the Justice on the ideology spectrum and their voting: more
conservative Justices vote more often in favor of business. In this case,
183. See supra notes 113-14.
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the R 2 value indicates that the ideology score explains over 20% of the
likelihood to vote pro-business or pro-investor, a quite meaningful result.
D. Reversal of Different Circuits
The last graph, Figure 12 below, does not address the correlation
between Justices' ideology and voting, but considers the total percentage
of cases reversed or remanded, and breaks this percentage down by the
circuit from which the case arose. These findings offer some basis for
further research.
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Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits. These two circuits decide
a high number of securities lawsuits because they include New York and
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Chicago, the two principal U.S. financial centers. As a result, their judges
have a particular expertise in issues of financial regulation, and the
Supreme Court is less inclined to overrule them than it is other courts.
Of course from the point of view of this Article, which investigates
primarily the correlation between ideology and voting patterns, it would
also be interesting to test if a "conservative" Supreme Court more often
overruled "liberal" courts of appeals, and vice versa. This question can
be the subject of future research.
CONCLUSION

According to Justice John Paul Stevens's memoir about his years at
the Supreme Court, in 1946 the gym was situated directly above the
courtroom. 184 A law clerk shooting basketballs during a hearing disturbed
the Justices, and Chief Justice Fred Vinson introduced an unwritten rule
that no basketball was allowed during oral arguments. 85 Most likely, the
Justices unanimously agreed on this decision independent of their
ideological preferences.
When the Justices meet to decide cases dealing with financial
regulation issues, however, their ideology appears to have a seat at the
conference table. This Article has demonstrated that more conservative
Justices vote more often in favor of business, and more liberal ones vote
more often in favor of investors. In other words, there is a correlation
between the voting of the Justices and their position on the political
spectrum, and this appears to be consistent using different measures of
the ideology or political affiliations of the Justices.
Of course, there are exceptions to this general statistical trend, and this
confirms the independence of Supreme Court Justices. However, this
Article's findings do not in any way imply that the Justices distort the law
to pursue a personal agenda, that they favor certain defendants, or even
that they are "activists." The observation that ideology plays a role in
their decision-making might simply mean that when the law is
ambiguous, or does not clearly resolve an issue, the Justices' views
concerning the underlying policy of the securities laws affect their
reading of complex legal issues, as should be the case.
This Article also offers additional insights on the work of the Court in
securities disputes. For example, it appears that in more recent years the
Court has become increasingly divided-at least considering the number
of dissents published-and more conservative (i.e., more pro-business).
This is especially evident when comparing the Roberts Court to the
184. STEVENS, supra note 17, at 61-62.

185. Id. The clerk causing the disturbance was Byron White, the first former law clerk who
a President (Kennedy) later appointed as a Justice. Id.
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Rehnquist Court. The empirical evidence in this Article offers a different
perspective than the findings of Professor Pritchard in an article already
mentioned on securities laws under the Roberts Court, according to which
the Roberts Court appears less pro-business and more inclined to
maintain the status quo with respect to Rule 1Ob-5 class actions.186 The
different outcomes are not necessarily in conflict, however, considering
the different scope and methodology of his research and that presented in
this Article.
The data also indicate that pro-business decisions seem more
controversial, again considering the number of dissents. This result might
suggest that liberal Justices are more active than are conservative ones in
voicing their positions when they are not satisfied with a decision.
Finally, this Article's evidence suggests that the Court may take into
some account, at least implicitly and maybe unconsciously, the general
economic conditions in its decisions in the area of financial markets.

186. See Pritchard, supra note 27, at 135.
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